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 Chapter 3 
 Rationality and Discursive Articulation 
in Place-Making 
 Huib  Ernste 
 Late-Modern Action-Theoretic Approaches and “Rational” 
Interventions 
 Rationality is the ability to design, follow, and have knowledge about a systematic 
procedure for the redemption of validity claims. In classical philosophy the term 
denotes the ability of the mind in terms of reason ( nous, intellectus, Vernunft ) and 
rationality ( logos, ratio, Verstand ) (Mittelstraß,  1995 , p. 470). The  logos provides 
the argumentation for the views one holds. Logos is the capacity not just for making 
statements but also for providing their proofs, and a statement is proven by being 
derived as a conclusion from premises (Welsch,  1999 ). But these premises them-
selves cannot be secured through argumentation. It is here that reason comes in. 
Traditionally, reason is therefore conceived of as the faculty capable of guarantee-
ing these fi rst premises, by intuition (Plato) or induction (Aristotle). One could say 
that reason provides the specifi city of the situation at hand, the context from which 
rationality is supposed to draw its conclusions. 
 It was the paradigmatically modern philosopher Immanuel Kant who, with his 
Copernican turn, stated that it is actually the other way around, that rationality pro-
vides the constitutive categories and principles of cognition and that reason pro-
vides only regulative ideas, through which one experiences particularities as parts of 
a destined whole. 1 In modernity, therefore, rationality is regarded as the most impor-
tant ability, and reason can ultimately be done away with (Feyerabend,  1987 ). Seen 
in this way, rationality autonomously establishes its own principles, methods, and 
1  In Kant’s terminology the idea of a  soul prescribes us to link particular psychological appearances 
to a whole; the idea of a  world prescribes us to connect all our singular observations to a unity 
called world; and, fi nally, the idea of  God urges us to see things as result of a causal chain. Together 
these ideas create a systematic unity in our perception (Störig,  1989 , p. 404). 
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perspectives. In modernity it is also recognized that there is not just one single type 
of rationality but different types, which cannot be reduced to each other. Each type 
determines its own principles. Developing Kant’s ideas about theoretical, practical, 
and aesthetic rationality further, Habermas ( 1984 ) paradigmatically distinguished 
between cognitive, moral, and aesthetic rationality. Habermas built not only on 
Kant’s work but also on that of Max Weber, who fi rst made rationality a key concept 
in modernistic thinking and used the term specifi cally in the sense of purposive 
rationality or economic rationality, the meaning it is also often has in colloquial 
language. It thereby denotes the strategic choice of the best means to reach a certain 
goal. In this way rational decision-making became of central interest and positioned 
rationality and action theory as core concepts in high modernity. Weber elaborated 
the role of rationality for individual everyday actions and called attention to the 
tendency toward disenchantment, that is, toward continuous differentiation and 
rationalization. 
 Rationalization in this sense designates a historical drive toward a world in which 
“one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (Weber, 1919/ 1946 , p. 136), 
by rational decision-making. This process of rationalization was not limited to the 
economic sphere but was extended with its own rational logics also to law and 
administration, the social and political spheres, and other domains. As a prerequi-
site, a peculiarly rational and intellectual type of personality or person of vocation 
was presupposed. Modern scientifi c and technological knowledge slowly pushed 
back the germinating grounds of human knowledge, such as religion and metaphys-
ics, and created a culture of “objectifi cation” ( Versachlichung ). At the same time, 
there was a loss of substantive-value rationality, the emergence of a polytheism of 
value fragmentation, and the related tensions between these two developments, in 
other words, rationality without reason in practice. 
 It is in this framework that one must also situate geographical action theory as 
put forward by Benno Werlen (Chap.  2 , in this volume or  1987 ,  1995 ,  1997 ) in the 
phenomenological tradition of Alfred Schütz ( 1932 ). According to this school of 
thought, the internal mental intentionality directed to outer objects is what ascribes 
meanings to these objects, as people do through their everyday place-making and 
everyday spatially differentiated actions. This geographic action theory can be 
interpreted as the subjectivist version of what Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny 
( 2001 ) and Reckwitz ( 2002 ) designated as the mentalist paradigm in social theory. 
This approach contrasts with the objectivist version of mentalism, which stems 
from classical structuralism as exemplifi ed by de Saussure (1916/ 1972 ) in linguis-
tics, Lévy-Strauss ( 1969 ) in anthropology, Althusser (1965/ 2005 ) and Emerson 
( 1984 ) in Marxist economics, and Piaget ( 1970 ) in psychology. One could also add 
the more contemporary version of psychological structuralism (Lacan,  2002 ); 
behaviorist psychology (Skinner,  1938 ; Watson,  1913 ); and cognitive psychology 
(e.g., Broadbent,  1987 ), including cognitive linguistics (Fauconnier,  1999 ). The 
approach diverges from behavioral geography (Golledge & Stimson,  1996 ) as well, 
for which human behavior is an effect of structures in the unconscious mind in rela-
tion to structured situations and is thus part of the objectivist mentalist tradition. 
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 In geographic action theory, on the other hand, the assumption is that the active 
mind is in charge. In this case, however, the sources of spatial structurations are not 
unconscious cognitive structures in hard-wired reaction to external structures but 
rather the sequence of intentional acts as conscious decisions. The aim of analysis 
from the angle of this social phenomenology is to describe the voluntarist subjective 
act, mental interpretations of agents and subjective logics, and rationalities of 
decision- making and behavior. This intentional goal-oriented kind of geographic 
action is thus clearly related to the late-modern project based on Weber’s ideas of 
rationalization as a purely subjective mental process and individual rational inter-
ventions in the surrounding world. Even in Schütz’s ( 1932 ) version of social phe-
nomenology or Mead’s ( 1934 ) social behaviorist approach, in which meanings are 
grounded in social relations, the individual subjective mind is still the seat of judg-
ment and rational choice. Mental structures and mental activities, therefore, are 
treated as an incontestable “center” of social and spatial structuration (Reckwitz, 
 2002 , p. 247). 
 Habermas’s ( 1984 ) stance on rationalization differs in this sense from Werlen’s 
approach in that Habermas partly decenters rationalization from the individual sub-
ject to the pragmatics of social interaction. “In speech acts, the agents refer to a 
non-subjective realm of semantic propositions and of pragmatic rules concerning 
the use of signs” (Reckwitz,  2002 , p. 249). For geography, this language-pragmatics 
approach was detailed by Zierhofer ( 2002 ) and Schlottmann ( 2007 ). This approach 
can be seen as a critique of the pure mentalist program but does not reject it entirely, 
for there are still interacting agents endowed with minds (Reckwitz,  2002 , p. 249). 
In that sense one can speak of a further development in action theory or of late- 
modernist views on rational action and intervention, where agency is partly decen-
tered from the individual actor to external pragmatic procedures of interaction 2 and 
structural relationships within whose framework these interactions occur. Reckwitz 
( 2002 , p. 249) and Moebius ( 2008 , p. 67) call these intersubjective performative 
approaches  intersubjectivism . A third stream of social theory in their systematics is 
based on poststructuralist thinking. 
 Poststructuralist Theories of Practice and “Critical” 
Interventions 
 With the advent of poststructuralist thinking, there has been great reluctance to con-
ceptualize human behavior as conscious rational actions, and in most poststructural-
ist literature the term  action is generally avoided. Systematic content analysis would 
probably reveal a shift in the discursive use of the term even in those poststructural-
ist writings that do not explicitly address this change in conceptualization. Foucault’s 
early work, for example, shows a preference for the term  practice rather than the 
2  This understanding of rationality is not restricted to purposive economic rationality; it is refi gured 
as a  praxial (pragmatic) form of rationality and rational critique (Schrag,  1992 , p. 57–59). 
3 Rationality and Discursive Articulation in Place-Making
60
term  action . In a seminal paper on this change, Schatzki et al. ( 2001 ) even coined 
the expression  practice turn . Talking about practice instead of action indeed amounts 
to a novel picture of human agency and rationality (Reckwitz,  2008 , p. 98) and 
opens up a certain way of seeing and analyzing social phenomena, which inevitably 
also imply a certain political and ethical dimension. For lack of a better word, 
Reckwitz, writing about theories of practice, describes this poststructuralist 
endeavor as  textualism . In contrast to Benno Werlen, with his subjective mentalist 
approach of geographical action theory, and to Zierhofer ( 2002 ), who advocated the 
language-pragmatics approach in geography, poststructuralist thinkers do not tend 
to place structures inside the mind or in pragmatic procedures of interaction but 
rather “outside” it—in chains of signs, in symbols, discourse, or text. The subject is 
thereby decentered even further, that is, into discourses about sign systems. These 
discourses are seen not as mere representations of mental qualities behind them but 
as a sequence of external events from which symbolic structures are manifested. In 
a similar way, but with different arguments, Geertz’s ( 1973 ) symbolic anthropology 
and Luhmann’s (2002/ 2013 ) constructivist theory of social systems also focus on 
the structural aspects of society outside the subject. What all these textualist 
approaches have in common is their critical perspective on the essentialization of a 
universal and fi xed principle of rationality and their celebration of the contextually 
and historically dependent logics of structuration and discursive meanings. But that 
is then their only critical thrust, and one could ask whether it spells the end of criti-
cal rational deliberations or what will be next? To a certain degree the view of post-
structuralist thinkers is not that different from the late-modernist view of action 
theory or from language pragmatics. The poststructuralists proceed along the same 
line, only going a bit further. They, too, advocate a plurality of kinds of rationality, 
and list a wide range of possible frames for action but do not describe them as types 
of rationality but rather as systems of meanings and logics of structurations of 
power. Furthermore, poststructuralists emphasize that there is no single standard 
version of a given rationality, that each rationality contains multiple paradigms, 
each establishing its own set of principles, institutions, and lines of confl ict that 
need to be taken into account. 
 In this context it is important to be aware that relationships between different 
players within this language game are described only in terms of power relations, 
which make it diffi cult to imagine some kind of metarationality regulating this plu-
rality of differences. The relational sense in which Foucault and most of his post-
structuralist followers use the concept of power makes clear that power is everywhere 
and that it is not an attribute of individuals. Yet that understanding subsumes almost 
all relational issues under the highly ambiguous concept of power, reducing it to a 
merely descriptive term and sapping most of its critical potential. Both late-modern 
and poststructuralist approaches thus lack of a metanarrative. 
 However, what started as a reconceptualization of human actions as practices—a 
change that began in early poststructuralist approaches in order to counterbalance 
the mentalist roots of action-theoretic approaches—ultimately overstated structural-
ist effects of discursive systems of meaning and obscured rationality’s critical 
potential to solve struggles of difference. Full-fl edged theories of practice as 
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 discussed by Schatzki et al. ( 2001 ) and Reckwitz ( 2002 ) are bids to fi nd a real bal-
ance between body and mind, things and knowledge, discourse and language prag-
matics, structure and process, and the agent and the individual. 
 Current theories of practice constitute an effort to reformulate the Aristotelian 
conception of phronesis, which implies that practice is seen as the basis and purpose 
of theoretical knowledge (Flyvbjerg,  2001 ). That conception also implies an escape 
from the dualism of the subjective and objective (Bernstein,  1971 ; Stern,  2003 , 
p. 185). Schatzki is seen as one of the leading thinkers in this approach, and he bases 
his practice theory on a new societal social ontology in which the dualism of onto-
logical individualism and holism is overcome (Schatzki,  2006 ). He calls his new 
ontology  site ontology , defi ning  site as a type of context in which human coexis-
tence takes place and which also includes the social entities themselves. Social 
events can thus be understood only through an analysis of this site. The close rela-
tionship between this concept of site and the geographic concept of place (Tuan, 
 2001 ) is evident:
 Practice theory places practices at the center of the socio-human sciences instead of tradi-
tional structures, systems, events, actions. None of the practices can be reduced to a sum of 
its elements, which are of a complex character: they are mental and material, factual and 
relational, human and material, individual and supra-individual, etc. This conception also 
overcomes the dualism action/structure,…Each practice then operates in a typical regime, 
according to particular scenarios, it has its inherent normativity, etc. (Višňovský,  2009 , 
p. 391) 
 Because these particular practices are interlinked and intertwined, there arises 
the issue of how one can rationally deal with this host of situations. With this ques-
tion in mind, it is worthwhile to explore some of discourse theory’s new develop-
ments that may be able to offer important answers. 
 Discursive Articulations and the Return of “Rational” 
Interventions 
 In a review of different theoretical approaches to analyzing the restructuring of 
space and place in urban regions in Hungary and England, Varró ( 2010 ) shows the 
genealogy of what she called a “Politics of Space Approach” (p. 59) based on appli-
cation of discourse theory to the analysis of spatial change. Focusing chiefl y on 
discourse theory, she refers to the work of Laclau and Mouffe ( 1985 ; see also 
Andersen,  2003 ). Laclau and Mouffe draw on Gramsci’s ( 1992 ) concept of hege-
mony, which denoted the capacity of the ruling class to eliminate oppositional 
forces by incorporating them into a collective will based on a shared system of 
meanings (values, attitudes, beliefs, and morality). “Laclau and Mouffe acknowl-
edge, and carry forward, Gramsci’s proposition to see collective will as formed 
through the articulation of various identities, i.e., processes where identities are 
‘brought together’ and mutually modify each other” (Varró,  2010 , p. 46). But they 
disapprove of Gramsci’s ( 1992 ) class reductionism and the assumed dominance of 
3 Rationality and Discursive Articulation in Place-Making
62
economic relations in the making of space. Social and spatial identities are thus 
fundamentally “unfi xed” (p. 88) and are only partially fi xed through hegemonic 
practices of articulation. Discourse becomes “an attempt to dominate the fi eld of 
discursivity, to arrest the fl ow of differences, to construct a centre” (Laclau & 
Mouffe,  1985 , p. 112). Discourse can therefore be seen as the totality of an act of 
performance, including linguistic and nonlinguistic elements (Laclau & Mouffe, 
 1987 ). This inclusiveness brings in an element of political, strategic, or deliberative 
interaction and thus opens room for the process of rational deliberation, though 
Laclau and Mouffe ( 1985 ,  1987 ) refrain from using the qualifi cation  rational for 
this inherently political process of radical democracy. Jessop ( 1990 ) and Howarth 
( 2004 , p. 271) have criticized Laclau and Mouffe ( 1985 ,  1987 ) for not illustrating 
how such a radical democracy can be characterized and institutionalized. Mouffe 
( 2005 ) does not get much further than stating that the crucial issue for democratic 
politics is not the eradication of confl ict via consensus but rather the legitimation of 
a multiplicity of opinions, attributions of meaning, and identities—in short, the 
legitimation of confl ict or a consensus on difference. His observation seems to 
imply that the potential hostility and  antagonism of political forces is turned into 
 agonism , where opponents are seen not as enemies to be destroyed but as legitimate 
adversaries whose ideas can be countered (Mouffe,  2005 ). As Jacob Torfi ng ( 1999 ) 
observed,
 post-structuralist insights might help to sustain an  agonistic democracy that is capable of 
transforming enemies into adversaries....the nomadization and hybridization of identity 
might contribute to the dissolution of antagonistic frontiers (Mouffe,  1994 , pp. 110–111). 
Nomadization refers to the attempt to undercut the allegiance of a specifi c identity to a 
certain place or a certain property, and thereby to show that all identities are constructed in 
and through hegemonic power struggles. This will tend to denaturalize social and political 
identities and make them more negotiable. Hybridization refers to the attempt to make 
people realize that their identity is multiple in the sense of constituting an over-determined 
ensemble of identifi cations. (p. 255) 
 In Laclau and Mouffe’s thinking this idea of an agonistic democracy is also extended 
to their own normative claim for radical democratization, as the very nature of the 
process of radical democratization is itself part of an agonistic debate and depends 
on a contingent, but at least largely shared, symbolic space (Mouffe,  2005 , p. 121). 
This extension, however, still does not explain how such a political debate or delib-
eration takes place and what the radical democratic politics look like in action, not 
just as a starting point or outcome. At this juncture the interactionist outlook seems 
to be more useful. In general it is clear how the different traditions of social theory, 
ranging from mentalist and interactionist to textualist points of view, each address 
different complementary aspects of the political praxis put forward by Laclau and 
Mouffe ( 1985 ). 
 To develop this approach to praxis theory further, it is essential to rethink con-
cepts of reason and rationality so as to create space for pluralistic forms of rational-
ity and for transversal refl ections (Welsch,  1999 ), even for rational interventions. 
This space seems to have been obscured thus far by the concepts used by Laclau and 
Mouffe ( 1985 ), which were inspired mainly by Marxist and poststructuralist 
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 thinking, and by some misinterpretation of the original concept of rationality in this 
context. Varró ( 2010 ) noted a similar misunderstanding with respect to the concept 
of discourse between critical realist thinkers and discourse theorists. 
 In the de-essentialized and dynamic, but nevertheless highly structuralist and 
imprisoning, interpretation of discourses and practices reminiscent of early Foucault 
( 1972 ) and the practice turn (Schatzki et al.,  2001 ; Višňovský,  2009 ), there seems 
little space for rationality or reason in the traditional modernist sense. In this frame-
work, politics—and thus also spatial politics—seems to be defi ned primarily as 
authority and power and seems to deal only with the effects of power relations and 
not with the structure of the deliberations that take place in the framework of these 
relations. 
 As part of the misunderstanding of rationality, rationality is seen only as a foun-
dational universal concept, for it was forwarded by enlightenment at a time when 
reason had actually been expelled from the view of the human being’s abilities to 
deliberate about the world. However, Welsch ( 1997 ,  1999 ) prompted the question of 
how to differentiate and judge the various systems of meaning and logics, or the 
various forms of rationality involved, without some all-embracing perspective. 
Distinctions and judgments based on any one of these types or paradigms of ratio-
nality would necessarily misrepresent the others. Welsch suggested that there must 
be a different type of functioning that underlies human refl ective capacity. It is this 
type of refl ection that he reintroduced as reason, enhancing rationality—or better, 
enhancing rationalit ies . In a seminal book written in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, 
Schrag ( 1992 ) took up and endorsed this very specifi c kind of reason. Both scholars 
called it  transversal reason (Schrag,  1992 , p. 148; Welsch,  1997 , p. 315). Because 
transversal reason relates geographic realities and geographic differences to each 
other, it is crucial for the geographic perspective as well. As the refl exive ability to 
recognize and clarify the differences as well as the relationships between the vari-
ous forms of rationality, transversal reason is actually a necessary condition for the 
theory of plurality and difference. 
 Related to the current situation of plurality and hybridity, this kind of transversal 
reason is not a new invention but rather a skill that is increasingly used consciously 
or unconsciously in everyday practice and that is becoming more and more an inner 
constituent of people’s reasoning and life designs. The present age is not one seem-
ingly bereft of rationality but rather one in which reason and rationality are reunited 
as a mental and refl ective activity operating at every step of rational deliberation on 
discursive articulations.
 Reason and rationality are not two separate faculties, and in a sense are not faculties at all, 
but rather signify different layers and functional modes of our refl ective activity. ‘Reason’ 
refers to the basic mechanism, ‘rationality’ to the various concrete, object-directed [or place 
related] versions of this activity. (Welsch,  1999 , Pt. III, sec. 5, par. 2) 
 From this standpoint geography is primarily about developing these skills of 
reason and rational deliberation in a situation characterized by social and geograph-
ical diversity. The latest advances in social theory and in their operationalization in 
human geography—possible to outline only very tentatively in this chapter—yield 
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a research program on human geography that combines several schools of thought 
with that discipline’s political commitment to create a knowledge base and refl ec-
tive skills for subsequent rational interventions. 
 Conclusion 
 To conclude this chapter, I offer a summary of the main steps in my argumentation. 
First, I have tried to show that rationality was separated from reason during the 
philosophical development of modernity and that it assumed a universal and fi xed 
principle of rationality. In late-modern times this discernment led to recognition of 
different types of rationality, each with its own logics of deliberation and argumen-
tation. Second, I have shown how these views are intricately involved in late- modern 
geographical theories of action and in language-pragmatic approaches in geogra-
phy. At the same time, I have pointed out the mentalistic inheritances of this 
approach. Third, I have noted that proponents of poststructuralist theories, in a quest 
to emphasize the structural aspects of discourses, seem to have totally done away 
with rational deliberations. However, advocates of full-fl edged theories of practice 
do not go that far and really seek a middle road. Fourth, I have tried to show that 
newer forms of discourse theory in the tradition of Laclau and Mouffe ( 1985 ) seem 
to offer this space for a real theory of practice and seem to reopen an opportunity for 
refl ective political deliberations in the different fashions of discursive articulation. 
Finally, I argued that combining Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive approach with new 
forms of rationalization that include transversal reason (Schrag,  1992 ; Welsch, 
 1997 ) might result in a framework for a rational approach to the politics of space as 
a core business for human geographers. 
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